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THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF 
CHILDREN 
HARRY SHULMAN 
, It is undoubtedly true that the law of torts does not gener-
ally hold children to the exercise of the same degree of care and 
intelligence that it requi:J;es of adults. To do otherwise, would 
be to shut its eyes, ostrich-like, to the facts of life and to bur-
den unduly the child's growth to majority. Similar concessions 
to immaturity are made in other branches of the law. The same 
realism, however, necessitates the recognition of the fact that 
at some age prior to twenty-one, and in some situations, a minor 
is fully as competent as a person over twenty-one and should 
be held to the same standard of conduct. It is not the purpose 
of this paper to discover that age and those situations. Assum-
ing that the adult standard is not to be applied, the problem 
is what standard, if any, is to be used. Again, it is not the pur-
pose of this paper to discuss the legal presumptions that many 
jurisdictions apply to minors. Such fictitious presumptions can 
be justified only, if at all, on grounds of expediency and facility 
in the administration of trials. But, whether or not the law 
of the particular jurisdiction raises a conclusive presumption 
that infants under seven years are incapable of contributory 
negligence, and rebuttable presumptions that minors between 
seven and fourteen are not capable and minors over fourteen are 
capable of contributory negligence/ still the question is raised: 
If the minor is capable of negligence, by what standard, if any, 
is his conduct to be measured? 
There are very few cases in which the problem is raised in an 
issue of direct negligence for which the infant is sought to be 
held Iiable.2 Most of the cases discussing the problem are con-
cerned with the child's alleged contributory negligence, or as-
sumption of risk or some other disabling contributory fault. In 
many cases where the child's conduct is considered, the only issue 
relates to the negligence of the defendant, and the infant's con-
duct is important only in determining whether or not the de-
1 See Birmingham & A. R. R. v. Mattison, 166 Ala. 602, 52 So. 49 (1909} ; 
L. R. A. 1917 F 10, 42, annotation; Notes (1926} 5 TEX. L. REV. 447; (1925} 
74 u. PA. L. REV. 79. 
2 For a well considered discussion of the general tort liability of infants 
see Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons (1924} 23 
MICH. L. REv. 9, reprinted in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 
(1926) 543. See also (1925) 3 N. Y. L. REV. 389. 
[ 618] 
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fendant discharged his duty of reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances. 3 
The standard of conduct to which an infant is to be held ·when 
his own liability is in question may properly be quite different 
from that to which he is to be held when he see1{S to recover from 
an admittedly negligent defendant.4 It is apparent that different 
considerations may be involved in these several types of cases. 
There is a strong policy in favor of protecting children from 
losses attributable to their immaturity. It 'vould be quite plaus-
ible, therefore, for a court to be more lenient toward children 
whose injmies are attributable, not only to their immatm·ity, but 
also to conceded tortious conduct on the part of the defendant, 
than toward children who are the sole responsible causes of injury 
to others. Yet the cases do not enter into niceties. The opinions 
are replete with loose language, sometimes altogether unneces-
sary, sometimes equivocal, sometimes incomplete, and sometimes 
even contradictory of statements in the very same opinion. A 
law review editor has recently concluded that, for the purpose 
of determining contributory negligence, 
"the acts of a child are tested by the individual capacity of 
the child himself . • • • [The standard] is subjective, depending 
entirely upon the individual capacity of the child." 4" 
It will be shown that such statements are not entirely true. 
There is some objective standard even in the case of children. 
There are cases in which it is said that the care required of 
children is that care which is ordinarily exercised under similar 
circumstances by children of the same age.10 But it is apparent 
3 It is obvious that an actor is required to be more careful when his 
conduct is likely to endanger children than when it is likely to endanger 
only adults. In general, unless a defendant has reason to know otherwise, 
he is entitled to assume that persons and things will react as they are 
commonly supposed to react under the circumstances. Children do generally 
exercise a lesser caution for their own safety than do adults. Since this 
is common knowledge, a defendant is not only entitled to assume it, but 
he is charged with the knowledge of it, and must act with a view to it. In 
determining a defendant's negligence toward a child, it may, therefore, 
become important to ascertain whether or not the defendant should have 
forseen a particular kind of conduct on the part of the child. 
4 This may be true in the case of adults as well as in the case of children. 
Accepting the doctrine of contributory negligence, it does not at all neces-
sarily follow that the care used by X to prevent injury to others, or his 
duty to perceive the possibility of, and pro\'ide against, injury to other3 
is to be measured by the same standard as that employed to measure the 
care that X used to prevent injury to himself or his duty to forezee, and 
provide against, injury to himself by an admittedly negligent person. 
4• See Note (1925) 74 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 80. 
5 Ayers v. Ratshesky, 213 Mass. 589, 101 N. E. 78 (1913) ; Jacobs v. 
Koehler Sporting Goods Co., 208 N. Y. 416, 102 N. E. 519 (1913). It is 
apparent from the conte}.i; of the opinions in these cases that age is not the 
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that such statements are not intended to be complete and that 
age is not the only individualized quality even in those cases. 
Judicial opinion is overwhelmingly to this effect. Thus: 
..... "the sounder doctrine seems to be that age is an important 
but not decisive factor ....• " 0 "It is the capacity, not the age 
of an infant that is the criterion .... " 7 "The average child of 
its own age is not the standard by which to measure its legal 
diligence .... " 8 "Age is of no significance except as a mark 
of capacity." 9 "Age is not the true test in such cases." 10 Most 
of the plethora of cases on this point, including many in the juris-
dictions cited in note 5, individualize some other qualities in ad-
dition to age. In one case or another, the courts have named, in 
diverse combinations the following qualities which are to be 
individualized: age, ability, alertness, appreciation, capability, 
capacity, comprehension, discernment, discretion, development, 
education, experience, intelligence, judgment, knowledge, matur-
ity, reason, sex, understanding.11 Age is included in all the com-
binations. Usually the combination consists of three qualities; 
only quality to be individualized. It is to be noted, further, that in such 
cases as the above there is no evidence of a departure by the particular 
child from the intelligence common to children of his age. It is therefore 
presumed that it is a child of normal intelligence for its age. See infra 
note 20. 
o See Berdos v. Tremont & S. Mills, 209 Mass. 489, 494, 95 N. E. 876, 
878 (1911). 
1 See Fink v. Kansas C. S. Ry., 161 Mo. App. 314, 330, 143 S. W. 568, 
!>73 (1912). 
s See Herrington v. Mayor & Council of Macon, 125 Ga. 58, 60, 54 S. E. 
'71, 72 (1906). 
9 See Western & A. R. R. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397, 416, 7 S. E. 912, 914 
(1888). 
10 See Trudell v. Grand Trunk Ry., 126 Mich. 73, 78, 85 N. W. 260, 262 
(1901). 
n Garrison v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 92 Ark. 437, 123 S. W. 667 
(1909) ; Linthicum v. Truitt, 2 Boyce 338, 80 Atl. 245 (Del. 1911) ; Balti-
more & 0. S. W. Ry. v. Then, 159 III. 535, 42 N. E. 971 (1896); Seifert v. 
Schaible, 81 Kan. 323, 105 Pac. 529 (1909) ; Berdos v. Tremont & S. Mills, 
supra note 6; Baker v. Flint & P. M. R. R., 68 Mich. 90, 36 N. W. 836 
(1897); Mollica v. Michigan C. R. R., 170 Mich. 96, 135 N. W. 927 (1912); 
Solomon v. Public Serv. Ry., 87 N.J. L. 284, 92 Atl. 942 (1915); Ackerman 
v. Stacey, 157 App. Div. 835, 143 N.Y. Supp. 227 (4th Dept. 1913); Clove-
land C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Grambo, 103 Ohio St. 471, 134 N. E. 648 (1921) ; 
Thomas v. Oregon Short Line, 47 Utah 394, 154 Pac. 777 (1916) ; Bentson 
v. Brown, 186 Wis. 629, 203 N. W. 380 (1925); Ramirez v. Cheyenne, 34 
Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710 (1925); see (1927) 2 WASH. L. REV. 204. 
Of course, in so far as a court recognizes the conclusive presumption that 
cllildren under a given age are incapable of contributory negligence, ago 
is, for children in that class, the sole standard and the only individualized 
quality. 
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and the combination,-age, intelligence and experience is the 
most frequent one.12 
If a child is unusually intelligent, or experienced, or well in-
formed for one of his age, he is held to the exe1·cise of greater 
caution than the ordinary child with the intelligence, experience, 
and knowledge common to that ageP The quality of his con-
duct must be commensurate with his superiority. Many of the 
cases found really go no further than that (though their lan-
guage is general to the effect that the qualities of intelligence, 
experience and knowledge are always to be individualized in the 
case of children) .14 An increase in the requirements on the 
ground of superiority does not, however, negative the existence 
of a minimum standard to which children must conform. Nor 
is the principle peculiar to cases of infants. If an adult has 
greater knowledge or experience than an ordinary person in his 
position would have, he is required to exercise that greater 
knowledge and e>..-perience.1 G Instances of superiority are not 
important in determining a minimum standard. 
Deficiencies of a particular individual are, however, of pri-
mary importance. On the whole, adults cannot defend imputations 
of negligence on the ground that in mental capacity, e:...-perience 
or knowledge they fall below the standard of the reasonable 
man.16 In the case of infants, on the contrary, deficiencies in 
mental capacity, experience or knowledge are to be considered 
in determining whether or not their conduct is negligent. Thus, 
the Delaware court has stated that the ordinary rule 
"is to be modified' according to the maturity and capacity of 
the infant, his ability to understand and appreciate the danger 
and his familiarity with all the surroundings • . . • While a 
particular act committed by an infant of discerning age might 
clearly constitute contributory negligence, yet, if the same act 
should be committed by an infant of less discernment, it might 
not constitute conh·ibutory negligence." 17 
12 See cases collected in L. R. A. 1917 F 10-41, annotation. 
13 Ma-rius v. Motor Delivery Co., 146 App. Div. 608, 131 N. Y. Supp. 357 
(1st Dept. 1911) ; Grealish v. Brooklyn, Q. C. & S. Ry., 130 App. Div. 238, 
114 N.Y. Supp. 582 (2d Dept. 1909), aif'd 197 N.Y. 540, 91 N. E. 1114 
(1910) ; Thomas v. Oregon Short Line, supra note 11. Other cases cited in 
this paper also bear this out. 
J.4 Thomas v. Oregon Short Line, supra note 11; Derringer v. Tatley, 34 
.N.D. 43, 157 N. W. 811 (1916). 
J.S See Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective (1927) 41 HAnv. L. 
REV. 1, 17. But one is not held to his own valuation of interests and de-
termination of social utility, or to his own judgment ns to the propriety 
of conduct. 
1s Professor Seavey, in the article cited supra note 15, admits this for the 
quality, intelligence, but qualifies it as to knowledge and m-.-perience. 
J.7 See Linthicum v. Truitt, supra note 11, at 347; 80 Atl. at 249. 
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So also, an Arkansas court held that where there was testi-
mony to the effect that the plaintiff (16 years old) "was of in-
ferior intelligence . . . was not bright and did not have good 
understanding," the jury should have been instructed to con-
sider the plaintiff's "intelligence" and "capacity." 18 Similar 
holdings are implicit in cases which refuse to make allowances 
for backwardness in the particular child on the ground that there 
was no evidence, or insuffcient evidence, of such backwardness.10 
The burden of raising the issue of, and proving, backwardness 
is on the child. If no claim of inferiority is made it is properly 
presumed that the child has the intelligence and experience com-
mon to children of its age.20 
With all the above-named qualities individualized, even if they 
are not mutually exclusive, it is difficult to see what is left for 
standardization. The mere fact that there is such a great di-
versity of expression and so much periphrasis on this point is 
sufficient evidence to raise a strong doubt as to the existence of 
a standard. 
Yet there seems to be some standardization. No court ever 
says that a child is to be held to the measure of care which the 
particular child in question ordinarily exercises.21 On the con-
trary, the courts always state the measure with some objectivity. 
The usual statement is that a child is held to the exercise of the 
degree of care which ordinary children of his age, intelligence 
and experience (or whatever combination is used) ordinarily 
exercise under similar circumstances.22 Sometimes it is the care 
which is reasonably to be expected of children of his age,23 ex-
perience and intelligence. Sometimes it is "the care of the class 
of persons to which the injured belongs.24 Sometimes it is the 
1s Garrison v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., supra note 11. 
19 North Hudson Co. Ry. v. Flanagan, 57 N.J. L. 696, 32 Atl. 216 (1895); 
Verdon v. Crescent Auto Co., 80 N.J. L. 199, 76 Atl. 346 (1910); Grube v. 
Baltimore, 132 Md. 355, 103 Atl. 948 (1918) ; Nicolosi v. Clark, 169 Cal. 
746, 147 Pac. 971 (1915). 
Such also is the import of the cases cited throughout this paper to tho 
effect that the degree of care required of an infant is that reasonably 
to be expected from or ordinarily exercised by children of his age, in· 
telligence and experience. 
20 See Verdon v. Crescent Auto. Co~, supra note 19. This may explain 
those cases cited supra note 5 which name only age as the individualized 
quality. 
21 That would be the least requirement consistent with the application 
of the doctrine of contributory negligence, and it would be entirely in· 
dividualized. 
22 See almost any of the cases cited in this paper, particularly those 
supra note 11. 
2a Mollica v. Michigan C. R. R., supra note 11; Ramirez v. Cheyenne, 
supra note 11; Marius v. Motor Delivery Co., supra note 13. 
24 Schoonover v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 69 W.Va. 560, 73 S. E. 266 (1911). 
I 
' 
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care of ordinary,!!G prudent and careful children of his age, 
experience and so forth; or of the great mass of children of his 
age, and so forth.20 In the words of the 1\!aine court, "The 
standard is the conduct of bo~rs who are ordinarily careful." ::r 
Another 1\faine decision sets the standard as "that degree of care 
'which ordinarily prudent children of their age and e.'\.-perience 
are accustomed to use under similar circumstances' .•••• " ~6 A 
Missouri court has held it error to refuse an insh·uction which 
stated the standard as "a reasonably prudent and careful boy 
of similar age .... " 29 A New York court has stated the stand-
ard to be the care of a "reasonably careful and cautious boy of 
that age .... " 30 A Delaware decision speaks of the st.'lndard as 
"that degree of care which children ••• of ordinary care and 
prudence are accustomed to exercise •••• " 31 Similarly an Ar-
kansas opinion states it as "that care which one of his age, in-
telligence, and ordinary prudence would exercise • • • ." 32 
Finally, a :Maryland case 33 quotes ·with approval a statement in 
a Massachusetts decision 
"that children, as well as adults, should use the prudence and 
discretion which persons of their years ordinarily have, and that 
they cannot be permitted with impunity to indulge in conduct 
which they know, or ought to know, to be careless, because chil-
dren are often reckless and mischievous." :a 
It cannot fairly be said that this persistence in e::-..-pression is 
mere logomachy, or that such statements are euphemisms for 
expressions like "the care which this particular child ordinarily 
exercises." If a child has the capacity to appreciate danger and 
is sufficiently e:h.-perienced to avoid it, but is regularly more reck-
less or daring than ordinary children of his age, intelligence and 
expelience, he will be held to the standard of conduct established 
by such ordinary children rather than by his own usually reck-
less conduct.35 Evidence of particular trends tov:ards reckless-
2s Bentson v. Brown, supra. note 11; Day v. Cunningham, 125 Me. 328, 
133 Atl. 855 (1926) ; Sullivan v. Chauvenet, 186 S. W. 1090 (Mo. App. 
1916). 
2s Quinn v. Ross Motor Car Co., 157 Wis. 543, 147 N. W. 1000 (1014). 
21 See Crosby v. Maine C. R. R., 1131'11e. 270, 274; 93 Atl. 744, 745 (l!l15). 
2s See Day v. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 332, 133 Atl. at SSG. 
29 See Sullivan v. Chauvenet, supra note 25, at 1092. 
3o See Ackerman v. Stacey, supra. note 11, at 838, 143 N. Y. Supp. at 220. 
31 See Linthicum v. Truitt, supra note 11, nt 347, SO Atl. at 249. 
32 See Garrison v. St. Louis, I. 1'11. & S. Ry., supra note 11, at 444, 12.3 
S. W. at 661. 
33 See Havermale v. Houck, 122 Md. 82, 89, 89 Atl. 314, 316 (1913). 
34 See Collins v. South Boston R. R., 142 Mass. 301, 315, 7 N. E. SGG, 
860 (1886). 
35 In addition to the cases cited supra notes 27 through 34, see Bentson 
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ness and impetuosity on the part of a particular child is not 
admissible on an issue of his contributory negligence. 30 
A similar restriction is evidenced in cases involving the liabil-
ity of landowners to infant trespassers for injuries resulting 
from dangerous instrumentalities on their land. 37 The doctrine 
of "attractive nuisance" is to be invoked for the protection of 
infants who cannot know or appreciate the danger,38 infants who 
do not "comprehend" the consequences "of meddling" with the 
instrumentality.39 "If ... children of such age as to be ordin-
arily capable of discerning and avoiding danger are injured while 
trespassing upon the premises of another, they may be without 
remedy .... " 40 In B1·inkley Gar Go. v. Gooper,41 the defendant 
left a pool of hot water on his land, and the plaintiff, six years 
of age, stepped into it and was scalded. The court said : 42 
"If the pool of water was open ... and the boy had notice that 
it was hot, we think that the company could reasonably suppose 
that a boy of six years of age would not intentionally or care-
lessly put his foot into water known by him to be hot, and if he 
did so, and injury resulted, we do not think the company is 
responsible." 
v. Brown, supra note 11; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Grambo, supra. 
note 11; Clerici v. Gennari, 132 Atl. 667 (N. J. 1926). 
as Bridger v. Asheville & S. R. R., 27 S. C. 456, 3 S. E. 860 (1887) ; seo 
Collins v. South Boston R. R., supra note 34. See also the following cases 
in which it was held that, as a matter of law, a child cannot recover whore 
the evidence showed that he lmew the danger and was intelligent enough 
to appreciate it: Moran v. Smith, 114 Me. 55, 95 Atl. 272 (1915) ; 
Schoonover v. Baltimore & .o. R. R., supra note 24; Vorrath v. Burke, 63 
N. J. L. 188, 42 Atl. 838 (1899) ; Austin v. Public Service Co., 299 Ill. 112, 
132 N. E. 458 (1921); Zoltovski v. Gzella, 159 Mich. 620, 124 N. W. 527 
(1910). 
37 For a full discussion of this problem see Smith, ltiability of Land~ 
owners to Children Entering without Permission (1898) 11 HARv. L. REV. 
349, reprinted in SELECTiEID ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 367; 
Hudson, The Tttrntable Cases in the Federal Cottrts (1923) 36 HARV. L. 
REV. 826', reprinted ibid. 397. For a reference to sources see also BoHLEN, 
CASES ON TORTS (2d ed. 1925)· 366-386, particularly 383, n. 36. And see 
Professor Bohlen's explanations in The Duty of a Landowner Towards 
Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right (1921) 69 U. PA. L. 
REV. 340, 347-350, reprinted in BOHLEN, op. cit. supra. note 2, at 190-193. 
38 See Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 900, 91 N. W. 
880, 882 (1902) ; McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401, 406, 100 N. E. 168, 
170 (1912). 
39 See George v. Los Angeles Ry., 126 Cal. 357, 364, 58 Pac. 819, 821 
(1899). . 
40 See Tucker v. Draper, 62 Neb. 66, 73, 86 N. W. 917, 919 (1901), quoted· 
with approval in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Krayenbuhl, supra note 38, at 
901, 91 N. W. at 882. 
41 70 Ark. 331, 67 s. w. 752 (1901). 
42 Ibid. 336, 67 S. W. at 754. 
HeinOnline  -- 37 Yale L. J. 625 1927-1928
STANDARD OF CARE FOR CHILDREN 625 
The leading case of Edington v. Bzo·lington, C. R. & N. Ry.,43 
which introduced the "turntable doctline" into Iowa, clearly 
points out that the doctrine can be invoked only for the protec-
tion of reasonably careful children, not for the protection of the 
reckless or daring. The court states: 4 ' 
" ... the hoodlums ... find no immunity or protection in the 
law as we interpret it . . . . They know the difference bet\veen 
right and wrong and understand the meaning of trespass • • •• 
They disregard property 1·ights from mere love of mischief and 
take risks out of mere bravado, or in conscious defiance of moral 
and legal restraint. When a boy is thus injured, we may pity 
his foll~r, but justly say, as the law says, that, having intelligently 
assumed the risk, he ought not to recover damages." 
The courts which recognize the doctrine of "attractive 
nuisance" ;,viii lift the defence of trespass only in favor of rea-
sonably prudent children who cannot appreciate the fact that 
they are trespassing and acting wrongfully.'~ 
Is there, then, any objective standard ;,vith which an infant's 
conduct must be compared'? As to liability-creating conduct a 
conclusion cannot here be d1·awn. But as to contributory fault, 
at least, there is sufficient data for a conclusion. The mental 
capacity, the knowledge and experience of the particular child, 
are to be taken in consideration in each case. These qualities are 
individualized-subjective-but o11ly for the purpose of deter-
mining whether or not the child was capable of perceiving the 
risk of injury to himself and of avoiding the danger. Beyond 
that, there is an objective standard. In determining whether 
or not his conduct was proper in view of Iris intelligence, kno·wl-
edge and e:ll..-perience, his conduct is to be compared ;,vith that 
of the careful and prudent clrild of similar qualities. Just as 
in the case of adults, one of the qualities of the standard "reason-
able man" is consistent carefulness or prudence,'ll so in the case 
of infants, the element of prudence is standardized. A definition 
of the term will not be attempted. In this connection, at least, 
prudence does connote a certain selfishness-a proper regard for 
one's own safety. It includes more. It conveys an idea of proper 
evaluation of interests, of proper choice of conduct. At any rate, 
it is a conveniently vague term to admit of adjustment to par-
ticular situations in a field of law where certainty in advance is 
not all-important. 
43116 Iowa 410, 90 N. w. 95 (1902). 
44Jbid. 436-7, 90 N. W. at 104. 
45 Nicolosi v. Clark, suwa note 19; Pennington v. Little Pirate Gas Co., 
106 Kan. 569, 189 Pac. 137 (1920) ; Grube v. Baltimore, supra note 19. 
46 See Seavey, op. cit. suwa note 15, at 11, n. 11. 
